Mistrust between Russia and the west will outlast the Trump era

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The writer is director of the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center in Berlin

“What was said about the desire to restore relations with Russia, to bring about the end of the Ukrainian crisis in my opinion this deserves attention at least,” Russian President Vladimir Putin stated after Donald Trump won the US election. The Kremlin expects that Trump’s presidency will be a gift that keeps on giving — both in Ukraine and beyond.

Publicly, the Russian leadership remains guarded concerning its expectations of the new administration. If, for example, Trump pushes to bring global oil prices down to $50 per barrel, that may create long-term challenges to Putin’s system of rule. But the Kremlin may hope that the disruptions that Trump will create for Washington’s European allies will offset potential downsides.

The main fear in western capitals is that Trump will drastically decrease support for Ukraine against Russian aggression. He has pledged to end the war swiftly, and his close associates have floated proposals that would freeze the fighting along the current lines of contact. That would leave 20 per cent of Ukrainian territory occupied, with no meaningful assurance that Russia wouldn’t invade again later.

Of course, a push for a ceasefire doesn’t mean that the US would accept Putin’s maximalist demand of Ukraine’s de facto subordination to Russia. Even with an imperfect ceasefire in place and beyond the elusive question of Nato membership for Kyiv, the US might take steps to ensure that Ukraine survives as a sovereign state, including providing weapons and training, and investing in Kyiv’s conventional deterrence capabilities. If consistently implemented over a long period once the fighting ends, these measures could make the cost of a new war against Ukraine prohibitive for Russia. That is why Putin may be willing to keep fighting. 

Yet Putin may also have reasons to agree to an imperfect deal — for now. The Kremlin’s war machine needs a timeout to rearm and rebuild its offensive capacity. The Kremlin may hope that once Trump is able to claim the peacemaker’s mantle, his priorities will shift, his administration will be pulled in different directions, Ukraine will be left in a state of gradual implosion and Europeans will be too divided to take the lead in providing enough assistance to Kyiv.

While there are too many wild cards on the table to predict the outcomes of diplomacy after Trump’s inauguration, his election removes incentives for Putin to engage meaningfully with the sitting administration in the time it has left. Putin hopes to get a better deal, if not a perfect one, from Trump. The Biden administration has few if any sticks with which to force him into an agreement that is better for Kyiv than a potential deal brokered by Trump. Moreover, the interim period creates plenty of risks of its own: for example, the temptation for Putin to destroy what’s left of Ukraine’s energy infrastructure this winter, thereby building more leverage for future talks. Defusing this threat requires quiet diplomacy with the Kremlin that may involve both the incoming and outgoing White House teams.

Desirable as it is that the shooting in Ukraine stops, the fundamental causes of the confrontation between Moscow and the west will remain. Trump’s victory has reconfirmed Putin’s view that the west is so politically unstable that policies can drastically change with every election cycle. Mistrust of the west will therefore persist, particularly as the Russian system becomes increasingly populated with veterans of the conflict and Putin plans to stay in power until at least 2036.

So if Trump’s team tries to offer incentives to Moscow to lure it out of Beijing’s embrace, the Kremlin will gladly pocket any carrots that the US may dangle. But it will not do anything meaningful to rock its partnership with the giant neighbour, because China’s authoritarian communist system, and President Xi Jinping himself, will probably outlast Trump in the White House. If anything, any overtures from Trump may somewhat strengthen Moscow’s weakened hand in dealing with Beijing. Finally, the fracturing effect in Europe of Trump’s return and potential emboldening of populist right forces there is a natural gift to the Kremlin. So is the increased level of domestic polarisation and inward focus in the US that the second Trump term will bring.

The sad truth is that the fight against the west has become the organising principle of Putin’s regime and has created too many beneficiaries to be abandoned any time soon. Trump or no Trump, Russia’s foreign policy will be guided by anti-Americanism for at least as long as Putin is in the Kremlin.