Democrats do not know how to talk to young men — and it cost them

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The writer is an FT contributing editor, chief economist at American Compass and writes the Understanding America newsletter 

Late in the US presidential election campaign, Democrats discovered a serious problem. Young men, minorities especially, had abandoned the party in droves. An American Compass poll, conducted with YouGov in early October, captured a snapshot: 20 per cent of young non-white men had not yet settled on either Donald Trump or Kamala Harris, and those who had decided were evenly split. 

Harris did not know what to say to these defectors. Her coalition was built on an identity politics that presumed an alliance among younger and LGBTQ+ voters, women and people of colour, all sharing the same commitment to a progressive vision of social justice. Somewhat awkwardly, the actual agenda — fighting climate change and forgiving student debt, resisting any restrictions on immigration or abortion — aligned primarily with the interests and priorities of a white, female, college-educated elite. But anyone who looked like a coalition member was expected to vote accordingly.

Former president Barack Obama lectured young Black men for failing to offer Harris the enthusiasm to which she was entitled. “It makes me think that, well, you just aren’t feeling the idea of having a woman as president,” he said. “And now, you’re thinking about sitting out or supporting somebody who has a history of denigrating you, because you think that’s a sign of strength, because that’s what being a man is? Putting women down? That’s not acceptable.” 

The real reason that young non-white men (YNMs) were moving to the right was that they did not see politics in these racial or gendered terms at all, expressing values and priorities that align much more closely with those of the white working class (WWCs). The American Compass survey found, for instance, that YNMs and WWCs agreed that US culture placed too much emphasis on diversity, while affluent liberal women (ALWs) wanted a dramatic shift towards it.

YNMs looked like WWCs in their concern that “government regulates too much”, while ALWs overwhelmingly worried that “big business is using its power to destroy competition, squeeze workers and dominate politics”. The former groups prioritised living in an America “that honours our values and traditions”, the latter on one that “cares for the least fortunate among us”. The former strongly supported accelerating the mining of natural resources and building of factories, the latter group strongly opposed them. The former groups wanted to eliminate federal student loans and put universities on the hook for financing, the latter group did not. 

The inability to engage with these voters as citizens possessed with agency, rather than merely members of a category, was most apparent in the Harris campaign’s embarrassing attempt at a five-point “Opportunity Agenda for Black Men”. One point was “protect cryptocurrency investments so Black men who make them know their money is safe”, another read “legalise recreational marijuana”. 

If drugs and crypto wouldn’t do the trick, maybe video games and porn would? Tim Walz logged on to Twitch to play Madden NFL 25 with Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, though they abandoned the game at halftime with neither having scored a point. One well-funded Democratic Super Pac released an ad showing a Republican congressman taking a phone away from a young man watching porn. 

In the final days before the election, the Harris campaign abandoned even the pretence of appealing to young men directly. Now these men simply had an obligation to vote on behalf of women. “We have every right to demand the men in our lives do better by us,” pleaded Michelle Obama. Walz tweeted: “I want to talk to all the guys for a second. Think about all the women in your life . . . This election is about their lives and protecting their freedoms.” 

According to exit polls, Joe Biden won young men by double digits in 2020. In 2024, Donald Trump won them outright. Similar shifts among Latinos and in Democratic strongholds like New York City gave Trump the first popular-vote victory for a Republican in 20 years. New Jersey, Virginia and Minnesota moved into battleground territory. Illinois and New York ended up closer than Florida. The Obama “coalition of the ascendant” has shattered, and the identity politics that once held it together has proved incapable of reassembling it. Whatever comes next for Democrats will need to engage people as citizens, not categories. That will benefit not only the party, but also the politics and culture of the nation.