Rebel advances in Syria spell danger for Russia’s Middle Eastern ambitions

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The writer is the director of the Eurasia Nonproliferation Program at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies

While on the advance in Ukraine, Russia has recently suffered tactical setbacks in the Middle East. The fall of Aleppo to Syrian rebels is merely the latest in a string of developments — set in motion by the events of October 7 last year — to cause problems for the Kremlin. 

Amid the ongoing war in Gaza, Israel has taken on Russia’s partner Iran and its associates in the “axis of resistance” in a protracted tit-for-tat. In the spring, intensified Israeli operations in Syria eliminated scores of Iran-affiliated fighters and weapons. Israel upped the ante in September, unleashing a cyber-kinetic operation against Hizbollah which culminated in the killing of its leadership. In late October, it bombed Iran’s ballistic missile programme and other defence-industrial sites. 

While Israel has shown it means business vis-à-vis Iran, Moscow, with the war in Ukraine its top priority, has had neither the bandwidth nor desire to emerge as Iran’s knight in shining armour. More importantly, Israel’s campaigns have probably affected Iran’s capacity to transfer missiles and other gear to Russia — at least in the short-term. The simultaneity of fighting in Ukraine and the Middle East might have boosted Russia and Iran’s desire to co-operate, but at the same time it limits what support they can lend each other.

The lightning offensive by Syrian rebels now adds to Russia’s regional woes. Syria had been Russia’s success story. By intervening in the civil war in 2015, Vladimir Putin saved Syrian president Bashar al-Assad, cultivating the image of a loyal ally. The capture of Aleppo by the Syrian regime in late 2016 was pivotal, paving the way for Russia to launch the Astana process with Iran and Turkey. Since 2017, that process has dictated the trajectory of the conflict, facilitating the emergence of a precarious equilibrium among internal and external actors carving up the country. 

After its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Russia calculated that it could maintain the state of affairs in Syria with limited effort. It recalibrated its military presence and pushed for Assad’s regional and international rehabilitation, but hit a wall with the Syrian leader’s refusal to yield an inch to Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. Meanwhile, progress towards a genuine political solution to the conflict ground to a complete halt, with Russia stonewalling the convening of Syria’s constitutional committee. 

Last week, the Russians learnt the hard way that frozen conflicts like Syria are frozen only until they are not. Moscow had feared for months that Syria might get swept up in the regional aftershocks of October 7 and has seemed startled by the sheer scale and speed of the rebel offensive.

It is true that the post-October 7 dynamics have yielded benefits to Russia by diverting western attention and resources from Ukraine to the Middle East. But they have brought considerable risks to a thinly-stretched Russia, too. Iran is weaker today than it was a year ago; Israel’s campaign against Hizbollah helped to establish conditions favourable to the Aleppo offensive; and Turkey, Russia’s partner in the Astana process, sensed an opening to settle unfinished business in Syria.

So far, Russia’s regional setbacks are primarily tactical and of limited consequence for its Ukraine campaign. Whether they turn into strategic headaches will depend on the battlefield dynamics in Syria, on Israel’s appetite for further taking on Iran, and on the incoming Trump administration in the US.

Russia is now scrambling to thwart further rebel advances without having to send reinforcements to Syria. It may well succeed in protecting its influence. But should Israel or the US ratchet up the pressure on Iran, Russia’s ability to shield its partner will be limited.